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Factions in British and American 
Trade-Union Organizations: 
A Comparative Structural Approach 
Mal col m Warner and J. David Edelstein 
In this paper, the authors attempt to discuss the rela-
tionship between intra-organizational conjlict and faction-
alism, and how this manifests itself in différent ways in 
British and American unions. They start with a discussion of 
conflict, then attempt to set out the characteristics of factions, 
They next look at factionalism comparatively, and finally 
attempt an analytical framework which looks at the dimen-
sions of factionalism. 
INTRODUCTION 
In our increasingly organizational society, factionalism within volun-
tary organizations is an important part of the overall political process. 
This is most évident within political parties, where the outcomes of 
ideological struggles and contests for leadership, often largely détermine 
the choices available to an electorate. However, trade unions, professional 
associations and other membership organizations are often the arenas 
for political struggles, the outcomes of which directly or indirectly affect 
the overall political process. Ame-
rican associations of anthropologists, 
historians and other professionals 
hâve recently been agitated by diffé-
rences over the South East Asian 
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war. Blacks in American trade unions hâve formed caucuses to win full-
time posts, and otherwise extend the struggle for equality into the unions, 
hâve formed caucuses to win full-time posts, and otherwise extend the 
struggle for equality into the unions. 
On the basis of a broader conception of politics, trade unions in 
Britain and the United States hâve seen struggles of minority occupations 
for greater représentation in their councils, or for adjustements of wages in 
their favour. And ostensibly apolitical union office-seekers periodically 
accuse incumbents of too soft a policy in the pursuit of wage demands, 
at times with direct impact on attempts by government to regulate wages. 
Indeed, it might be difficult to find a factional struggle in any moderately 
large membership organization without a rather obvious external political 
implication. In order to shed light on the nature of factionalism we shall 
consider hère the kinds, causes and conséquences of factionalism in one 
particular type of organization, that is trade unions. We hope to give 
spécial attention to British-American différences in factional organization 
and style, anchoring the analysis in the gênerai thème of opposition in 
organizations, and their « internai conflict situations. » 1 
THE MEANING OF FACTIONALISM 
Intra-organizational Conflict and Factionalism 
One critical test we can apply to organizations, be they states, local 
govemments, clubs or trade unions, is the manner in which they deal 
with conflict and disagreement within their own boundaries. As has been 
pointed out, « If we are able to characterize the attitude which is adopted 
towards conflict, we hâve done much to characterize the entire organiza-
tion ». This is most obvious if the object of inquiry is a state. It would 
be possible to include much that is essential to the understanding of Nazi 
Germany, for example, in a discussion of just this one point. When the 
test is applied to a private association, however, there is less agreement 
that the test is equally meaningful or, indeed, relevant at ail. There is, 
in fact, a widespread assumption of unity inside private associations. This 
assumption appears to rest on the belief that, since most such associations 
are « voluntary » in the sensé that membership or non-membership is 
1
 See for example the définition of « faction » in Henry Pratt FAIRCHILD (éd.) 
Dictionary of Sociology, London, Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 113 as 
« developing within communities and established organizations out of internai con-
flict situations ». 
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presumed to be a matter of individual choice, the basis for conflict is 
absent. 2 
The rôle of intra-organizational conflict within national trade unions 
is of particular importance, and it may be seen as essentially related to 
the whole question of democracy within such organizations. Conflict can 
be seen as a phenomenon characteristic of ail organizations, in varying 
degrees, forms, and contexts.3 Indeed, there is generalised anxiety over 
conflict in organizations, sometimes concerning its présence and often 
its absence. 
Conflict is not always welcome in organizations, whatever form it 
takes. In trade unions, for example, « Leaders justify the non-existence 
of internai democracy with two powerful arguments. First, they point 
out, unions are organized for political or industrial conflict with non-
union groups. Success in this struggle requires a unity not unlike that of 
the State in its foreign policy. Second, union members as a group reflect 
a greater homogeneity of background and interests and hence less basis 
for internai conflict than do the citizens of a nation».4 Yet it is the 
latter of thèse arguments which is only relatively true, and normally 
unrelated to the former. In fact, there may be a cleavage of political 
interests between leaders and members. 
Further, it is clear that there are many Unes of conflict in a union. 
There are, for example, différences of interest between groups with dif-
férent senionty, between différent age-groups, between groups in différent 
plants, différent places and différent tasks, etc. We do not suggest that 
ail thèse are equally important, or even that ail represent conflicts : 
« However, where différence of interest does exist at ail in any degree, 
there is a potential of conflict. This conflict, which takes the form of 
factionalism, is, to paraphrase the words of James Madison in his famous 
2
 Lloyd FISHER and Grant MCCONNELL, « Internai Conflict and Labor-Union 
Solidarity», in (éd.) A. KORNHAUSER et al, Industrial Conflict, New York, McGraw 
Hill, 1954, p. 132. 
3
 See for example Claggett C. SMITH, « A Comparative Analysis of Some 
Conditions and Conséquences of Intra-Organizational Conflict», Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Cornell, Vol. 10, No. 4, March 1966, pp. 504-529. 
4 C.P. MAGRATH, « Democracy in Overalls : The Futile Quest for Union De-
mocracy », Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Cornell 12, 4, July 1959, p. 511. 
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discussion of faction, rooted in the nature of organization (if not in the 
nature of man) » 5 
Some consider factionalism, // they indeed consider it at ail (as it 
is relatively neglected in the sociological and political science literature 
compared with the concept of say, party, or élite) as a problem of internai 
conflict which must be solved if the organization is to survive. Some 
consensus must exist if the organization is to be capable of action. There 
are various ways in which this necessary consensus may be achieved. 
Thèse may be summarized under three headings ; (1) devices to secure 
a homogeneous membership, (2) suppression of dissent, and (3) the 
institutionalization of conflict. 6 It is the second and third of thèse factors 
with which we will most concern ourselves, and they do vary, as we will 
demonstrate, from one political culture to another, and especially, as we 
shall see, where factions are concerned. 
Organizations consequently usually try to control the spread of 
déviance. One such form is a taboo on the formalization of factions. 7 
But permissiveness vis-à-vis factions does not necessarily lead to disrup-
tion, or even divisiveness. The organized expression of conflict may be 
necessary to maintain the relationship of the members of the faction to 
the organization.8 The alternative may be a breakaway organization, or 
expulsion of the members singly. 
The strength of a movement, or collectivity, dépends of course, to 
some degree on the homogeneity, if not always of membership, often 
of intention or goals. Factions, 'fractions', and such, are often seen as 
diminishing the pursuit of selected goals. 
The response of the external environment is also an important factor 
to consider because factions may be discouraged when there are very 
active threats to the organization, without undue internai restrictions 
5
 FISHER & MCCONNELL, op. cit., pp. 132-133. « Faction » was originally used 
to refer to what has been later called « party » — for example, in the early politics 
of the United States. It had a similar usage in eighteenth century England, in the 
time of Burke. As political parties became more organized, factions became more 
or less fluid conflict groups within them. 
6
 FISHER & MCCONNELL, op. cit., p. 133. 
7 Amitai ETZIONI, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, Glencoe, 
Illinois, Free Press, 1961, p. 245. 
8
 Lewis COSER, The Functions of Social Conflict, London, Routledge, and Kegan 
Paul, 1956, p. 47. 
170 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 28, NO 1 
actually having to be enforced. But, on the other hand, in some cases 
internai dissent may be positively encouraged by hostile outside interests. 
Opposition and Factional Organization 
Electoral opposition may, under very spécial circumstances, involve 
neither factions nor parties. As in postal votes in some professional 
associations 9 a stable party system in unions is a rarity. Nevertheless, 
factions occur more widely than many would like to admit. A récent 
analysis by anthropologists has argued along the following lines : 1 0 
Factions are political conflict groups ; with members recruited by the 
leader, on diverse principles. Conflict, it continues, produces at least two 
factions ; if there is no conflict, faction is 'latent social structure'. The 
analysis adds that factions may be institutionalized in varying degrees, 
according to the society involved. Another view has looked at 'action-
sets' as a more meaningful mode of analysis. n Thèse hâve a degree of 
organization, but are nevertheless not quite definable as groups. They 
can however be dubbed interactive quasi-groups, for they are based on 
interacting sets of people. The focal point is a spécifie individual, but 
unlike the groups, the organization may be diffuse. He interacts with 
another member, but the latter does not necessarily hâve to interact with 
other members. The interaction is in a « séries of action-sets » which 
makes the faction, and is not necessarily based on principle, only trans-
action. This latter view is less applicable to trade unions than the first, 
because union factions are organized to a minimal degree. 
Barbash divides the forms of political organization to be found in 
unions into six types : 12 first, the party which he defines as open, per-
manent and formai ; the best illustration of this would be in the Lipset 
et al study of the Typographers' Union ; second, the club which can be 
defined as permanent but less formai and open — this is really a 
modification of the first type ; third, the caucus which can be seen as 
permanent or temporary, informai and somewhat open. Thèse are very 
9
 See J. David EDELSTEIN, « An Organizational Theory of Union Democracy », 
American Sociological Review, Washington, Vol. 32, Feb. 1967, pp. 24, 27. 
10
 Richard M. NICHOLAS, «Factions: A Comparative Analysis», in (éd.) 
Michael BANTON, Political Systems & the Distribution of Power, London, Tavistock, 
1965, pp. 21-62. 
il Adrian C. MAYER, « The Significance of Quasi-Groups in theStudy of Com-
plex Societies», in (éd.) Michael BANTON, The Social Anthropology of Complex 
Societies, London, Tavistock, 1970, for a broad anthropoligist's view of political 
compétition. 
12 Jack BARBASH, American Unions : Structure, Government and Politics, New 
York, Random House, 1967, pp. 131-133. 
FACTIONS IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNIONS - A COMPARATIVE... 171 
common in American unions although less so in British. An excellent 
example of a national caucus can be found in the U.A.W. (The United 
Automobile Workers) and meets each year at a Convention and is open 
to gênerai membership, often serving as an outlet for membership 
criticism. The fourth kind is the work group, in which members unité 
on the basis of common skill. The fifth is the pressure group alliance 
which unités local interest groups, for example, the local American trades 
councils. The sixth type is the under-cover organization based on a more 
or less secret type of organization. A notable example of this is the 
Communist Party cell which consists of members of the Party operating 
within a particular union. Barbash goes on to define factionalism as 
« the term by which union leaders generally refer to the organized spécial 
interest groupings within the union ».13 
We shall use the term 'faction' to mean at least a somewhat orga-
nized, special-purpose political group within a larger organization. This 
seems to more-or-less encompass its conventional meaning. A local 
branch or other recognized, stable unit of a larger organization might 
very well support a faction, or engage in activities which a faction might 
undertake, without itself being a faction or a part of faction. Any indi-
vidual member or sub-unit of the organization could engage in factional 
activity, which would mean activity in support of a faction or its aims. 
Loosely speaking, any political activity of a controversial nature, or in 
support of some sub-group, could be called 'factional', but in the absence 
of an organized faction we would prefer to equate factional with political. 
In unions and professional associations, where goals are so often éco-
nomie in the crudest sensé, Lasswell's définition of politics as the process 
through which it is decided who gets what, when, where and how, is 
particularly appropriate.14 A « party » would then be a particular kind 
of faction : one which is stable, and appeals to the gênerai electorate 
(ordinarily) for support. 
SOURCES AND SUPPORTING STRUCTURES OF FACTIONALISM 
Factionalism in Fédéral Organizations 
Factionalism in fédérations of national trade unions is quite common 
in the western world.15 Major political and industrial policy has often 
13 Ibid, p. 131. 
14 See Harold D. LASSWELL, Politics : Who Gets What, When, How, Glencoe, 
Illinois, Free Press, 1951, pp. 1-2. 
15 N.B., The undoubted intervention of foreign government, (such as the 
Soviet after the Révolution), labour international, and even spécifie foreign unions 
such as many American ones (in the cold war period) in union fédération affairs 
as a factor stimulating factionalism. 
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been debated within the national unions in advance of, and decided at, 
meetings of trade union fédérations. It is true that factionalism is usually 
quite différent in organizations consisting of subordinate organizations, 
rather than members. Factionalism in fédérations is usually based on 
coalitions of national unions, each dominated by its leadership and 
throwing its full weight (based on the practice of block voting) to one 
side or another. However, in some countries there are structural peculi-
arities within the fédérations which permit a closer link to factionalism in 
which the individual activist or secondary leader may participate. In 
others, including Britain, where this is not the case, an impending décision 
by the Trade Union Congress or the Labour Party can be the occasion 
for intense factional struggles within some of the national unions. One 
may also speculate that mass média coverage of expressions of important 
political différences within a fédération may sometimes contribute to 
the politicization of the public, including trade union members, which 
in turn may affect a factional situation within a national union. Finally, 
the internai politics of a national union are sometimes related to its 
external relationships, fédéral and otherwise, in fairly complex ways, 
as we shall illustrate later.16 
In gênerai, factionalism and even its supportive organizational 
structures are seldom to be entirely explained in their own terms. It has 
been suggested that : « decision-making processes (in labour fédérations) 
retain more heterogeneous and involve more levels in the organization 
in (a) smaller labour movements, (b) industrial relations Systems without 
or (with) less formalized machinery for national socio-economic policy-
making, and (c) cases of considérable ideological tradition and deep 
historical roots of the labour movement and the political System in 
gênerai. » n 
16
 Where there is no definite knowledge of causality, we may argue that 
factionalism refers to activities in one body calculated to lead to, or with a strong 
possibility of leading to, the organization of some opposition or subgroups within 
another union. 
17
 Op cit., p. 199. In this respect it is interesting that the national unions in 
the American Fédération of Labour successfully reduced the représentation of the 
inter-union city fédérations at the Federation's conventions, and limited their 
powers in other ways, in 1890's and early 1900's. CF . Lloyd ULMAN, The Rise of 
the National Union, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 378-387. 
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Other factors which may be relevant in the breakdown of the control 
a national union holds over its représentatives to a labour fédération 
are the absence of the practice of block voting, or the présence of 
uninstructed delegates to the Federation's convention. This, in fact, 
occurred in the American Fédération of Labour at the turn of the century, 
and enabled the Socialist Party to gain considérable support for its reso-
lutions among delegates to the A.F. of L. 's conventions.18 
Compétition for Membership 
Unions often compete against one another, either for membership 
or for political hegemony within the labour movement. In Britain and 
the United States, only the exceptional circumstances of a possible 
incipient breakaway group to a rival union (or for the formation of a 
rival union), could compétition for members be called factional in itself, 
and even then, this might be problematical. More common is the 
struggle for political leadership of national trade union fédérations or 
labour parties, involving a struggle over policy and control over the 
elected or appointed position. « Factionalism » usually implies a struggle 
over policies or scarce resources (including leadership posts) within an 
organization, and one may ask under what conditions compétition among 
national trade unions or their leaders is likely to lead to factions internai 
to the respective national unions, or at least one of them. 
On the American scène, there hâve been important examples of 
factions which eventually broke away from their national unions : the 
formation of the C.I.O. in the 1930's involved such transfers of local 
unions and members, to a certain extent. (Such developments hâve not 
been seen in Britain, even in the case of the Minority Movement in the 
late 1920's.) 
Union factionalism based on compétition between unions or union 
fédérations would ordinarily be short-lived, since a split, a change of 
affiliation or an expulsion of the proponents of the other organization 
would ordinarily occur fairly soon. However, in large Italian workplaces 
there is institutionalized compétition between the three major trade union 
fédérations — Communist, Socialist and Catholic dominated — for re-
18 Philip S. FONER, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, 
Volume III, 1900-1909, New York, International Publishers, 1964, p. 431. 
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présentation on the works councils. Thus, the compétition is intra-orga-
nizational, in the sensé that it takes place within the workplace.19 
Indirect Intra-Fédéral Influences, via the Mass Media 
The leaders of one national union no doubt ordinarily exert little 
direct factional influence on another, without some structured means of 
direct contact with their members. However, some leaders such as Walter 
Reuther of the United Automobile Workers of America were faeld in 
great esteem by members of other unions, and no doubt, for many 
members in greater esteem than their own leaders. One might at least 
suspect a tendency toward the broad diffusion of the political views of 
prominent labour leaders to union members, via the mass média. Rarely, 
there might be an institutionalized means for such a leader to receive an 
invitation to address members of another union from rank-and-filers in 
that union, as in the Durham Mineworkers, where each branch casts 
three votes annually for speakers to be invited to the next annual gala. 
Clément Attlee and Michael Foot, representing right and left Labour 
points of view, were among the four invited speakers in 1955 20 in spite 
of the fact that the leadership of the Durham région was firmly in the 
right-wing camp. Labour Members of Parliament rather than leaders of 
other national unions are usually invited, although the latter are not 
excluded. The Durham galas hâve been described as the largest meetings 
of unionists and their families in the world, with 250,000 claimed in 
attendance in 1960. 21 
Probably, knowledge of most political différences within the labour 
movement through the mass média reaches the members of national 
unions with the cove âge undoubtedly more comprehensive in Britain 
than the United States. For example, on 22 May 1969 the press reported 
the support of Président Nixon's proposed Safeguard Anti-Ballistic 
Missile by the AFL-CIO executive council by a vote of nineteen to five, 
with three abstentions, with mention of the names of the dissenters. 22 
19
 Walter GALENSON, Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe, Berkeley, 
Cal., University of California Press, 1961, p. 5. 
20
 Souvenir of the Durham Miners' Association Seventy-Seventh Annual Gala, 
Durham, Durham Miners' Association, 1960, p. 29. In 1959, Aneurin BEVAN, M.P., 
and Christopher MAYHEW, M.P. and Arthur BLENKINSOP, M.P., appeared. 
2 1
 Durham County Advertiser, Durham, July 22, 1960, p. 1. Those invited to 
the 1961 gala included Hugh GAITSKELL and Michael FOOT, prominent rïght and 
left wing Labour Party leaders at that time. 
22
 Victor RIESEL, « Labour Backs Safeguard ABM >, Post-Standard, Syracuse, 
N.Y., 22 May 1969, p. 7. RIESEL'S columns are nationally syndicated. 
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And, on 25 May 1970, the New York Times reported on its first page : 
« The head of one of the nation's largest trade unions broke today with 
the leadership of the American Fédération of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations and condemned the Vietnam and Cambodian 
war policies of the Nixon Administration ». Jacob S. Potofsky, the leader 
in question, was président of the 417,000 member Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, and a member of the AFL-CIO executive council. On the same 
day, newspaper advertisements appeared on the West Coast signed by 
451 union officiers, taking a similar position. Such public controversy 
within the American labour movement is, however, uncommon and no 
doubt can seldom be reflected directly in the internai politics of the 
national unions. However, it may at times provide a setting favourable 
to factional disputes. 
Factions and Temporary Extra-Labour Alliances 
Most union factionalism which extends beyond the boundaries of 
particular national unions is still within the bounds of the labour move-
ment, loosely considered to include socialistic and other groups primarily 
oriented toward workers or unions as their field of activity. However, 
at times politicians outside the labour movement and the government 
hâve played important rôles. This was true in 1969 when the West 
Virginia miners struck, apparently spontaneously, against unsafe con-
ditions in the mines and a failure of the mine owners and government 
to establish and maintain adéquate safety standards. Their main spokes-
man became Congresman Ken Hechler, of West Virginia, who was 
ungrudging in his identification with the striking miners, and who 
attacked the national union leaders as well as the mine owners. Hechler 
aligned himself with the newly established faction supporting executive 
board member Yablonski for the presidency of the union against the 
incumbent, Boyle. 23 Yablonski claimed intimidation and violence by the 
union leadership against himself and his supporters, and appealed to the 
Secretary of Labor for an investigation. Upon his defeat in the national 
référendum he claimed fraud, and again asked for government interven-
tion. He was murdered in December 1969 and within a few months grand 
juries had indicted a former local officiai of the miners' union, along 
with four others, on an accusation of organizing the killing. Yablonski's 
supporters accused the Secretary of Labor of lying and outright misre-
presentation after the murder, and of not pressing the investigation. M 
23 See Union Democracy in Action, New York, No. 37, Feb. 1970, p. 4. 
24 New York Times, New York, 27 May 1970, p. 29. 
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A nationally syndicated columnist pointed out that the Démocratie head 
of the Senate Labor Committee, which had $265,000 appropriated for 
an investigation of the events surrounding the élection campaign and 
murder, was « clearly taking it easy on the squalid UMW hierarchy to 
avoid offending his friends in organized labour. He is heavily dépendent 
upon the unions which had given his re-election priority over ail other 
Congressional candidates this year ». 25 
A West Virginia médical doctor who had campaigned successfully 
for state and fédéral mine health and safety législation, and who later 
supported Yablonski's try for the mine unions's presidency, ran in the 
May 1970 West Virginia Démocratie Congressional primary, « banking 
on the 30,000 miners and family members of voting âge in his district 
to help give him a majority in the contest... » 26 
Thus, the most important rank-and-file revolt in the Mine Workers 
in décades involved a Démocratie Congressman, and the Secretary of 
Labor of the Republican administration, and perhaps the leaders of the 
AFL-CIO either actively in support of, or passively in opposition to. the 
revolt. 
Factional Implications of Occupational Sub-Groups 
It has been argued that occupational groups could not be the basis 
for a sustained internai démocratie political life within a union, since 
« those interest groups which were in a minority could never hope to 
hâve their policies adopted ; » and further, that « it is likely that industrial 
unions must be dictatorial if they are to survive » in order « to arbitrate 
interest conflicts which cannot be settled by simply counting which 
interest group has more members » 27 
Occupational diversity can be a problem even in a professional 
assocation, as shown in a récent discussion within the American Psy-
chological Association : « We (the académie psychologists) are beset on 
three sides, by professional psychologists who want APA to serve their 
25 Jack ANDERSON, « Labor Ally Delays Mine Union Probe », Post-Standard, 
Syracuse, N.Y., 30 May 1970, p. 4. ANDERSON'S columns are nationally syndicated. 
26 « Pathologist Prospects — for Votes » (unsigned) Médical World News, New 
York, 8 May 1970, pp. 24-25. Reprints of this article were circulated nationally 
by mail shortly before the primary, along with an appeal for funds for the candidacy 
of H.A. WELLS, the doctor in question. 
27 Seymour M. LIPSET, Martin TROW, and James COLEMAN, Union Democracy, 
Glencœ, Illinois ; Free Press, 1956, pp. 307-308. 
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social causes, and by professional managers and communications special-
ists, who wish to govern us in the name of 'scientific management'... 
At présent, there is a move, apparently without serious opposition, 
to further open the rolls of A P A . . . Without contesting thèse moves, 
one may note that a conséquence will be that research scholars will 
become an even smaller minority within APA. Under thèse circumstances, 
can a démocratie structure work ? When issues arise where the profes-
sional psychologist's interest is opposed to that of the académie psycho-
logist, is it fair that a bare majority prevail ? . . . If our interests truly 
diverge (a point on which I am not convinced), perhaps the time has 
corne for APA to become a looser fédération. » 28 
While occupational diversity can probably not easily be the basis 
for an internally démocratie organizational life, it is nevertheless often 
the basis of transient factional activity. Where it receives formai récogni-
tion through représentation of sub-groups, for example on executive 
committees, it may even contribute at times towards the démocratie 
process. At any rate, différences in perceived occupational interests are 
often reflected in factional activity. « Diversity based on skill interests is 
seen most directly in the local union because it is closest to the job. The 
tyre builders in the American Rubber Workers hâve been described 
as 'a strong united work group in the plant and within the union.. . they 
chose their elected officiais upon the basis of service to the tire-builders 
not the union'. In the Transport Workers Union of the New York City 
transit System, George Taylor has reported : « the craftsmen did not think 
that the leadership was adequately defining their particular interest...» 
« . . . Women members in a meatpacking local organized to oust a maie 
président who they felt had agreed too readily to eliminate their job 
opportunities. In an auto local, the night shift workers provided the 
margin for the defeat of an incumbent officer because he called union 
meetings at a time when they could not attend... In the Musicians 
Union a large West Coast local seceded from the national union in 
protest against the use of record royalties to support unemployed 
musicians . . . » 29 
28
 Jane LOEVINGER, Statement in « APA and Public Policy : Should We Change 
our Tax-Exempt Status» American Psychologist, Washington, Volume 25, 7 July 
1970, pp. xv-xvi. 
29 BARBASH, op. cit., pp. 127-128. 
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There has been at least one important instance in Britain where 
leftwing politics and occupational interests hâve combined, within a 
national union, with great effect on collective bargaining and, less clearly, 
on the union itself.30 
Factionalism within unions often thus reflects the influence of com-
peting external organizations or forces, particularly those with structures 
penetrating or overlapping those of the individual unions. The fact of 
ideological pénétration has been noted,31 and offered as an explanation 
for democracy in the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, with the suggestion that, 
in gênerai, a stable organizational democracy may be sustained by com-
pétition among external political forces, (a) « the organization itself is 
non-partisan but provides only an opportunity, of a forum, within which 
contending positions may be heard » ; (b) « the issues themselves are not 
matters of life and death » to the organization ; and (c) particularly where 
« a mechanism of structured conflict seems to be the only method » for 
determining the outcome of the ideological compétition. An important 
aspect of such structure is the right, supported by values and traditions, 
to further a policy through the available mechanism. The major difficulty 
with this approach is in the relatively unspecified supportive organiza-
tional forms which deserve greater emphasis in a society where démocratie 
norms are assumed. 
While occupational heterogeneity is probably not the optimum con-
dition for a stable democracy in unions it often plays a positive rôle in the 
usually difficult climate for democracy found in such organizations.32 In 
the absence of a broader politieization of the membership, a moderate 
degree of heterogeneity or a clear-cut differentiation without sharp clashes 
in interest often seem to play an important second-best rôle. Certainly, 
factional tendencies would often be becalmed without them. The struct-
30
 See Philip S. BAGWELL, The Railwaymen, London, Allen & Unwin, 1963, 
pp. 349-350, on the Vigilance Committee in the National Union of Railwaymen. 
31 John G. CRAIG and Edward GROSS, « The Forum Theory of Organizational 
Democracy : Structured Guarantees as Time-Related Variables », American Socio-
logical Review, Washington, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 1970, pp. 19-33. 
32 Professional associations might very well be included in this generalization, 
although it applies less broadly to them. A lack of participation and opposition 
in such organizations has somewhat différent roots than in trade unions. We would 
speculate that professional associations with important collective bargaining func-
tions for employee-members, on the other hand, would tend to be more démocratie 
than either manual unions or non-bargaining professional associations. 
FACTIONS IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNIONS - A COMPARATIVE . . . 179 
ural, ideological or normative bases for the avoidance of splits due to 
heterogeneity are beyond our scope hère.33 
EFFECTS OF FACTIONALISM 
Observability and Factions 
It may be the rôle of a group or faction within an organization is to 
make observable that which has been ignored. Public opinion affects deci-
sion-makers to the degree that it is observable.34 The more observable a 
dissident group is, the greater its chance to pursue effective opposition. 
An overt, organized faction may hâve this quality. But the more observable 
it is, the more it may appear as an attack on union solidarity. Phenomena 
like factions may be one of the forms Merton seeks when he asks how 
unorganized interests may make their orientations observable. Ephemeral, 
as compared to basic interests, are more likely to involve unorganized, 
expressive than instrumental behaviour. Factions may also hâve another 
conséquence. Groups with strongly held views may hâve a quite considér-
able effect on the opinions of the members, where the latter hold their 
views weakly.35 
The removal of a proscribed organization, or formai group, will not 
necessarily dispose of the problem it posed. As Merton further re-
marks :3 6 « any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without 
providing adéquate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions pre-
viously fulfilled by the abolished organization is doomed to failure ». This 
theorem, which Merton considers basic, has implications for the problem 
of opposition in unions. It affects not only factions, but also amalgamated 
units of unions, or unions themselves which hâve been submerged into 
larger unions. Certainly, to change structures requires an understanding 
of the complexities of organizations, whether or not the theorem is an 
overstatement. Of course, a great deal hinges on the word « adéquate ». 
Observable Factionalism in British and American Unions 
Dissenters are « typically part and parcel of any mass membership 
organization » and « individual union members or even informai groups 
33 Among the formai mechanisms often used in trade unions are occupational 
or industrial représentation on national executive committees, and autonomy in the 
acceptance of collective bargaining agreements. 
34 Robert K. MERTON, Social Theory & Social Structure, Glencoe, Illinois, 
Free Press, 1957, p. 353. 
35 See Ibid, p. 333. 
36 Op. cit., p. 81. 
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of members frequently contend that their spécifie job grievances are not 
being pressed vigorously, their suggested contract demands neglected and 
their candidates for office (perhaps of their particular religious or ethnie 
origin) spurned by the union leadership ».37 However, such expressions 
of discontent need not lead to either the formation of nationally organized 
internai factions or opposition to national leaders in élections. Lipset 
has stated that : « actual opposition to the re-election of national leaders 
is almost non-existent among most European unions » 38, even when 
attempts are made to change union policies at national conférences. 
Neither the British nor the American union movements correspond to 
this picture, but differ however in contrasting ways. 
It is alleged that factionalism in British unions is almost invariably 
only semi-organized, or covertly organized, or at least restrained in organ-
izational techniques ;3 9 on the other hand, factions hâve been observed to 
be organized openly and formally in many American unions. While the 
typical élection of an American top officiai is uncontested, five out of 
fifty-one large American blue collar and semi-white collar unions had 
defeats of top officers during the 1949-66, and another five had defeats 
of second-ranking officers. Among thirty-one blue collar British unions 
with 15,000 or more members, fifteen elected their top officers to per-
manent posts. However, one of the remaining unions defeated its top 
officer and another its second-ranking officer. Very few British vacancies 
for the top officer were uncontested, and the typical filling of a vacancy 
involved a much closer vote in the United States. Thus the American 
unions as a group can be characterized as having had an occasional ré-
volution during 1949-66, while the British had fairly regular compétition. 
In neither country was the mean closeness of periodic élections high, but 
for those British unions which held periodic élections the mean was higher 
than the American. 
American Factions : some récent illustrations 
As has been recently observed : « Several American institutions, 
among them universities, business, church and government, hâve been 
37 Peter H E N L E , «Some Reflections on Organized Labor 8 the New Mi-
litants », Monthly Labor Review, Washington, July 1969, p . 20. 
38 Seymour M. LIPSET, « Trade Unions and Social Structure : II », Industrial 
Relations, Berkeley, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1962, p . 92. 
39 See Benjamin C. ROBERTS, Trade Union Government and Administration in 
Great Britain, London, Bell, 1956, pp. 243 ff. A partial but apparently inconsistent 
example is USDAW. See Christopher NORWOOD, M.P., «Secret Caucus Rule in 
U S D A W » , Voice of the Unions, London, May 1969, pp. 145-163. 
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confronted by disruptive protest intended to force changes in policies or 
procédures. Until recently, labor unions, which traditionally hâve been 
viewed as économie protest organizations, hâve been spared as a target 
of such protest.» ^ Although expressions dissent hâve typically taken 
the form of rejections of contracts or the voting out of union leaders, a 
récent form of dissent involves Black workers forming organizations out-
side normal union channels. 
A brief discussion of the nature of organized factionalism in ternis 
of such new movements will help to illustrate the présence of at least 
some of the factors described earlier. Of course, in the U.S. the situation 
has long varied greatly from union to union. If the well-known formai 
two-party system of the Typographers (ITU) discussed at length by Lipset, 
Trow and Coleman in Union Democracy (1956) seems exceptional, we 
wonder what a British observer might make of the 'Black Power' caucus 
in the United Automobile Workers.41 
Further illustrations of the degree of organization in such caucuses 
in American unions is provided in another récent example,42 — the rise 
of the Black workers' organized union groups based on the necessity, in 
their view, to fight union bureaucracy. Their leaders insisted that they 
were not an exclusively Black organization, yet they offered what such 
workers wanted and they decided to go about the task, not by excluding 
whites, but by controlling the caucus for their own interests. Their activities 
in Détroit were a direct challenge to Walter Reuther of the United Auto-
mobile Workers' Union (U.A.W.). The caucus in fact grew out of the 
Trade Union Leadership Council (T.U.L.C.) ten years ago, which was 
revived after the Black leaders had called a meeting and sent letters to 
Black activists to form an organization intended to be separate from the 
« vicious Racist Extremists », like the Dodge Revolutionary Union Move-
ment (D.R.U.M.), although it was noted that there were more Black 
workers outside picketing the meeting hall of the Ad Hoc Committee, than 
ail the Blacks inside it. 
One school of thought still is reasonably optimistic about the possi-
bility of continued cohésion within the American Labour movement. 43 It 
40 H E N L E , op. cit., p. 20. 
41 New York Times, 1 October 1968. 
42
 Charles DENBY, « Black Caucuses in the Unions », New Politics, New 
York, Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer 1968, pp. 10-17. 
43 Ray MARSHALL, The Negro and Organized Labor, New York, Wiley, 1965, 
p. 117. 
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believes that the Negro-labour split will probably continue, but in the 
long run will become less intense « because Negro leaders realise their 
dependence on the Labor Movement and discriminating unions will be 
subjected to increasing régulation by the Fédéral Government, the Courts 
and the AFL-CIO. » It believes that the trends in thèse directions are 
clearly visible and that although some blacks hâve been estranged from 
the labour movement, there is no strong possibility of them forming all-
black organizations 'for bargaining purposes'. They « appear to believe 
that the best chance for a solution to their problems is not to secede, but 
to exert maximum pressures within the mainstream of the Labor Move-
ment ». This view seems the most reasonable, but the long run is not yet 
hère, and in the short run much dépends upon the rate of unemployment 
and the économie situation generally. It is necessary to add : « As récent 
events hâve demonstrated, the rise of new, more disruptive groups of 
dissidents in various arenas of American life, does not always follow 
predicted paths ». u 
Factional Terminology 
Another illustration of the way in which American factionalism 
opérâtes, in contrast with the British, can be seen in the terminology of 
a récent call to a « National Rank and File Action Conférence » (held 
in late June 1970 in Chicago), which was intended to défend trade unions 
against « attacks from government and corporations, to défend the right 
to bargain and strike, to défend the membership right to ratify contracts, 
to build rank-and-file power, to get labor moving to take the offensive 
against racism, inflation and corporation attak for économie well-being 
of ail, to end the war — to get out of Asia, etc. ». What is particularly 
interesting is not so much the substence of the Conférence, but in the 
pamphlet advertising it, the criteria of qualification to attend. It stated 
that any trade unionist who represents not merely a local union or its 
comrnittee but « a group of workers organized in any form of rank and 
file comrnittee or caucus {such as a Black caucus, Puerto Rican, or Chicago 
caucus, women's or youth caucus, tax comrnittee, peace comrnittee, com-
rnittee for the right to vote on contracts, etc. » 45 can attend, as well as 
any worker representing such groups as unorganized or unemployed 
workers and any full-time trade union leaders who support the goals 
4 4
 HENLE, op. cit., p. 24. 
45
 Pamphlet, A Call to a National Rank & File Action Conférence, Chicago, 
June 1970, pp. 1-2. 
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outlined in the call to action. This référence to organized internai groups, 
most no doubt in opposition to their unions' policies if not to the officiais 
themselves, pinpoints the unique way in which openly organized factions 
operate in its American context. It is extremely unlikely that such a sent-
ence could appear even in an unofficial Shop Stewards' publication in 
Britain. The term « caucus » would rarely be used, and indeed the référ-
ence to any worker representing a group of unorganized workers would 
seem rather odd or out of place. However, the interunion character of 
the conférence, unusual in the United States, has similarities to the British 
national shop stewards conférences. On the basis of the foregoing récent 
American examples, it would be unreasonable to characterize factions 
as comparatively unstructured conflict groups. 46 We must not however, 
go too far in the opposite direction in failing to draw a relative distinction 
between parties in union politics, and less organized or less stable forms 
of opposition. Any treatment of the problem must deal adequately with 
groups which are comparatively structured, thus recognizing the full range 
of possibilities. 
British Factionaiism : some characteristics illustrated 47 
Factions in British unions are manifest in thèse less organized and 
less overt ways : — 
1. Loose communications networks of like-minded, usually politicized, 
officers and activists, each participant establishing his own sub-net-
work via the use of letters, téléphone and occasional personal contact. 
(May overlap with 3). 
2. Communications networks sometimes co-ordinated by members of 
outside political parties or groups, for example Communists, left-
wing or Gaitskellite members of the Labour Party during 1959-60. 
(May overlap with 3). 
3. Shop stewards movements, usually left-wing, often including mem-
bers of various unions. 
4. In a few instances, unpublicized but not entirely covert meetings of 
full-time officiais, say during annual or semi-annual meetings of full-
time staff. 
46 See NICHOLAS, op. cit., pp. 21-62. 
47 c.f. Roderick MARTIN, « Union Democracy : An Explanatory Framework », 
Sociology, Oxford, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1968, p. 214. ff. 
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British Miners : a case study 
The case of the British Mineworkers, in our view, is a good example 
to illustrate the différence between British and American factionalism 
even among fairly politicized unions. In spite of the fact that the différent 
régional governments hâve becn controlled by Communists, ex-Com-
munist leftists, and orthodox Labour leaderships in compétition with each 
other for national posts, little national factional literature has existed 
since at least 1946 even during contests for the national presidency and 
gênerai secretaryship. Open coalitions of like-minded régional leaderships 
in support of national candidates would, according to an interview with a 
national leader, hâve been considered illegitimate by the membership. 
This is in spite of the fact that some régions were obviously dominated by 
those of différent political persuasions, with différent policies advocated 
for the national union. 
Instead, there were isolated covert attempts to provide publicity in 
the form of literature ostensibly unrelated, in timing, to the coming élec-
tions. With one possible exception, it is extremely doubtful that even 
thèse received much circulation outside the authors' régions. The excep-
tion to this absence of campaign literature was the publication of Lau-
rence Daly's The Miners and the Nation, during his élection compaign in 
1968. It is significant that the defeated candidate subsequently protested 
this as an unfair attempt to influence the élection. 
The absence of open factions or national élection campaign literature 
is especially significant in the light of the fact that the national rule book 
contains no prohibition against electioneering of any kind ; and that no 
one prominent in the union — left, right or centre, has made an issue of 
the apparent ban on élection literature. 48 
It must not be assumed that this reflects the wishes or practice of 
ail sections of the Mineworkers union. The Derbyshire Miner, officiai 
newspaper of the Derbyshire région, has printed prominently displayed 
élection addresses of candidates for full-time régional office, and the 
Scottish régional journal has also given space to candidates. The relatively 
free dissémination of literature occurs in most wards in the élections for 
the rank-and-file executive council of the régional officer. 
48 The early post war minutes of a sub-committee of the National Executive 
contain a proposai for the circulation of élection addresses in a spécifie national 
élection. No positive action on this recommendation was found in the N.E.C. minutes, 
and it appears it was not effectuated. 
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In Durham, on the other hand, even organized canvassing is prohibit-
ed in favour of candidates for full-time régional office (and perhaps 
others), by rule. 
It should be clear that there is no uniformly accepted set of organiz-
ational norms concerning the circulation of literature in the Mineworkers. 
Nor is there a gênerai acceptance of permanent status for their full-time 
national officiais, in spite of the fact that permanence has been the rule 
since 1889. 
In the Mineworkers and the Engineers as in most British unions, 
extraunion literature of a political-factional nature circulâtes freely. An 
occasional, small independent miners' paper of militant leftist hue has 
circulated, primarily in Yorkshire. Copies hâve seemed typically difficult 
to obtain, and the paper has lived an almost fugitive existence, no doubt 
for want of financial support and regularized channels for circulation. But 
there are other means of publicity. A manifesto apparently representing 
the views of a group of left-wing miners was published in the Voice of the 
Unions, and sets out a broadsheet for industrial democracy. One important 
section of this publication deals with the Mineworkers and industrial de-
mocracy. The manifesto proposes a rank-and-file national executive com-
mittee, but also argues that, in the last analysis, democracy dépends on 
the people at base and on the shop floor finding ways to act together to 
make the structure work ; that the branches should form action committees 
and joint action committees with other branches to consider what must 
be done in the pit, in the union, and in the local community. 49 There are 
also spécifie proposais for the reorganization of the coal industry with 
union participation. 
Perhaps unofficial norms against factionalism may be subverted, or 
even break down completely, when compétition becomes fierce. In the 
most récent élection of the président in the British Mineworkers, the 
winner was accused (apparently without déniai) of having sent a large 
staff of campaigners into régions outside his own, while the officiai news-
paper of the Scottish région urged support of its candidate for the presi-
dency in bold headlines. Such changes in practices may be irreversable, 
at least in this union. 
49
 See for example : « A Programme for Action » (published in Voice of The 
Unions, London, Christmas, 1969). 
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The legitimacy of an open display of political programmes, and the 
exercise of such rights by the régions and by individual miners, lias not 
led to open factions or even an effective circulation of factional literature 
on a national scale. 
Communist and Anti-Communist Factions in British Unions 
This discussion would not be complète without a considération of 
the rôle of specifically Communist and anti-Communist factions, and of 
such external organizations. Whether or not polarization centering around 
such groups has been warranted, from the point of view of either right 
or left-wing unionists, superficially at least it has appeared to hâve do-
minated the political struggles in certain unions at certain times. The 
Communists hâve often been the best or even only organized left-wing 
group in some unions, and hâve thus been in a position to take advantage 
of militant or left-wing sentiment to achieve élective office. Presumably, 
in response to this, organizations hâve been formed to operate within 
unions to counter what they claimed to be an organized attempt of the 
officiai international Communist movement to dominate the labour move-
ment. In addition to thèse spécial anti-Communist groups, the officiai 
fédérations of national unions hâve at times intervened. This applies to 
both Britain and the United States, but the struggle has been moire pro-
longed in the former.50. The mass média hâve of course often exaggerated 
the rôle of the Communist Party, particularly in unofficial (or wildcat) 
strikes. 
The persistence with which the officiai Communist Party has played a 
rôle in British intra-union politics can only be understood in the light of 
the organizational weakness of the non-Communist left, and what may 
be characterized as the common British (but not American) view among 
workers that the Party is the left-wing of the working class and socialist 
movement — i.e. still within an acceptable range of déviation. The weak-
ness of the non-Communist left is international, although not unlversal, 
and probably stems ultimately from the ubiquitous présence of the Com-
munist countries and the cold war. But some additional explanation is 
required for the relative lack of intra-union organization of left-Labour 
socialists, more popular than the Communists, such as those centering 
around Tribune. 
50 See Henry PELLING, The British Communist Party, London, Black, 1958, for 
the broad background, pp. 1-25 esp. 
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Perhaps our statement that Communists are considered a part of 
the working-class movement in Britain is an overstatement, but the fact 
is that anti-Communism as such is not socially acceptable among most 
groups of unions. For example, the behaviour of a union member publicly 
arguing at a branch meeting that a candidate should not be elected to 
union office because he is a Communist would probably, we believe, be 
regarded as eccentric and socially unacceptable. At any rate, it « just 
isn't done » in most local situations. This has not been the case in the 
United States, and not simply since the cold war. The greater British 
tolérance of dissent is no doubt a factor, but a tolérance of supporters 
of the Conservative Party is not particularly great in many unions, for 
example the Mineworkers. 
As long ago as 1928, the T.U.C. attacked the influence of such 
organizations in the unions and the 1929 Congress warned them of disrup-
tive Communist activities. At that time the Party was trying to set up 
breakaway organizations through the tactic of the « Minority Move-
ment, » whose aim was to set up contacts in this country for the « Red 
International of Labour Unions ». (R.I.L.U.) This tactic failed and a 
conséquent tactic of infiltration led the T.U.C. in 1934 to counter the 
Communists, particularly in the Trade Councils. At that time the Com-
munist Party was trying to secure affiliation to the Labour Party under 
the guise of the « United Front » campaign. A similar « United Front » 
policy was pursued from 1939 to 1941 for the purpose of « stopping the 
war », and after 1941 for the purpose of « winning the war ». There were 
also similar attempts in the immédiate post-War period. 51 Two policy 
statements on the trade unions and Communism were published by the 
T.U.C. in 1948, and there was considérable activity via officiai union 
channels during the 'cold-war' years to challenge Communist influence 
within trade unions. 
One anti-Communist counter-organization, Common Cause, has 
been quite active52 backing anti-communist factional activity. It was 
organized in England in 1951, although it had been founded in the United 
States in 1947 by a wealthy American, Mrs. Natalie Wales Paine, with 
51
 See The Trades Union Congress, The Tactics of Disruption : Communist 
Methods Exposed, London, 1948, pp. 5-6, and the Trades Union Congress, Défend 
Democracy : Communist Activities Examined, London, 1948, pp. 1-2. 
52
 See Clive JENKINS, « The Common Cause », Tribune, London, 25 September, 
1964. See also Mark FORE, G.M.W.U. - Scab Union, Solidarity Pamphlet, London, 
No. 32, 1970, p. 5, p. 9, on the background of « Common Cause ». 
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the help of Lord Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton, the Tory M.P. for Inver-
nesshire. At this time the General Secretary was Dr. C.A. Smith, who 
at one time had been Chairman of the Independent Labour Party. In 
1954, the Association of Cinéma Télévision & Allied Technicians put a 
motion on the agenda of the Labour Party Conférence, asking that mem-
bership of the Common Cause be declared incompatible with membership 
of the Labour Party because the group of that organization had tried to 
influence balloting at the A.C.T.T. Annual Conférence. The Common 
Cause Advisory Council of 39 contained 13 persons of Labour or union 
connections. At the end of 1956, following internecine disputes, Dr. 
Smith resigned and most of the Labour-connected people with him. At 
this point, Sir Hartley Shawcross joined the Advisory Council. It was 
reported in May 1969 that Common Cause was acting as the channel by 
which money from industrial sources was passed to the Industrial Research 
Information Services, an anti-Communist body organized by former 
trade unionists with Jack Tanner, former leader of the then A.E..U., as 
Président. Also connected with the Common Cause was Jim Matthews, 
an ex-official of the N.U.G.M.W., but there is still allegedly an American 
link via directors of J. Walter Thompson Ltd., and The Readers Digest 
Association, etc. 
I.R.I.S. concentrâtes its activities on exposing Communists and mi-
litants in the trade union movement in its publication, I.R.I.S. News. It 
had been condemned by the T.U.C. in 1960 as an organization which 
« appears mainly to be devoted to influencing union élections ».53 The 
organization had been set up in 1956 and according to this source its 
manager for the first few years was James Nash, who then became head 
of the Research and Publicity Department of the National Union of Sea-
men. Jack Tanner has been mentioned, but another one of Tanner's co-
directors was Stanley James, formerly an assistant General Secretary of 
the National Union of Seamen. Also involved are Ray Gunter, ex-Minister 
of Labour, and Tom Williamson, ex-General Secretary of the G.M.W.U. 
The I.R.I.S. offices originally were situated in Maritime House, the N.U.S. 
Headquarters, and a lot of its activities hâve been concentrated on Com-
munist infiltration of the Seamen's union. I.R.I.S. News is still published 
and concentrâtes on « exposing » to trade union members, candidates 
whom they believe to be Communists, Trotskyists, candidates supported by 
thèse, or fellow travellers in coming union élections. 
53
 See Paul FOOT, « The Seamen's Struggle » in (eds) Robin BLACKBURN and 
Alexander COCKBURN, The Incompatibles : Trade Union Militancy and the Con-
sensus, London, Penguin, 1967, pp. 178-179. 
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BRITISHAND AMERICAN DIFFERENCES COMPARED 
Culture, Contra-culture and Organizational History 
There are a number of difficultés in the attempt to explain behaviour 
on the basis of culture. One is that fact that the explanations tend to be 
circular — common values and norms are frequently assumed from be-
haviour, and continuities presumably transmitted through social learning 
are assumed on the basis of what may be simply an adaptation to a self-
continuing existential situation. In modem societies the degree of con-
sensus on any question or practice tends to be exaggerated by social 
commentators. And finally, when the concept of culture is applied (per-
haps implicitly) to life within a large organization, which differs substan-
tially from the total society, probâbly too much is assumed concerning 
the capacity of the organization to envelope the individual in its unique 
System without administratively controlled sanctions. Even proponents of 
the idea of organizational culture hâve recognized that it is less dépendent 
upon personality development and more on the « tribulations and rewards 
of adult behavioural requirements. » 54 
With spécifie référence to the working classes of Britain and the 
United States, Mann has argued after a survey of the évidence on their 
political and économie attitudes : « Their compliance might be more con-
vincingly explained by their pragmatic acceptance of spécifie rôles than 
by any positive normative commitment to society.55 He also argues that 
« working-class individuals (our emphasis)... exhibit less internai con-
sistency in their values than middle class people ; » 56 and that «the work-
ing-class is more likely to support déviant values if those values relate 
either to concrète everyday life or to vague populist concepts than if they 
relate to an abstract political philosophy.57 Furthermore, there are some 
important gênerai objections to the idea that values integrate and legi-
timate modem social structures.58 
5 4
 Daniel KATZ and Robert L. KAHN,, The Social Psychology of Organizations, 
New York, Wiley, 1966, pp. 56-57, 65-66. 
5 5
 Michael MANN, « The Social Cohésion of Libéral Democracy », American 
Sociological Review, Washington, Vol. 35, No. 3, June 1970, p. 435. 
56 Op. cit., p. 432. 
57 ibid, p. 432. 
58 One of the more important for our présent purpose is that : « Most gênerai 
values, norms and social beliefs usually mentioned as integrating societies are ex-
tremely vague, and can be used to legitimate any social structure, existing or not. » 
Op. cit., p. 424. 
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The most basic relevant argument to date with respect to British-
American différences in political culture, with emphasis on the psycho-
logical orientation toward social objects 59 has been that while there are 
no important British-American différences in perceived ability to « do 
something about an unjust law, » 60 the British hâve greater expectations 
of « serîous considération in a government office and by the police. » 61 
From data such as this, it is generalized that the British are more 
accepting of the independent authority of governmental institutions. It is 
this basic fact which is translated into a description in terms of a greater 
British « déférence. » Historically, it is argued, the English « . . . had 
an elaborate set of rights dating at least from the seventeenth century . . . 
Thèse légal rights were enforced, not by political means, but through the 
independent courts of law. For our purposes the important historical de-
velopment is that the political rights acquired by Britons in the nineteenth 
century did not corne into conflict with the idea of an independent govern-
mental authority limited by some higher law. The notion of the indepen-
dent authority of government under law has continued to exist side by side 
with the notion of the political power of the people. The old authoritarian 
institutions and symbols were not replaced by democratization, but con-
tinued to coexist with the new institutions » 62. 
If anything, confidence in the administrative authorities was increased, 
« by adding a new force for the enforcement of the rules of law. » 63 
One problem which arises immediately from the apparent greater 
confidence in government administrators and the police which has been 
labelled déférence, is, is it deserved ? Are there objective bases for greater 
considération of the citizen ? If so, is this properly called déférence ? This 
is certainly a problem in the area of trade union government, where the 
British union officiais would appear to be more restricted in their powers, 
most honest financially, and more committee to gênerai social ideals. The 
truth could very well be rather complex : the British may hâve both a 
deserved respect (as compared to Americans) for administrative authority 
59
 Gabriel A. ALMOND and Sidney VERBA, The Civic ^Culture, Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press, 1963, p. 13. 
60 ibid., p. 173. 
61 Ibid., p. 181. 
62 ibid., p. 177. 
63 Ibid., p. 177. 
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in unions and government, where fairness of such administration is con-
cerned, and they may hâve a generalized, irrelevant respect (for example, 
toward aristocratie titles and institutions). Would a dishonest union offi-
ciai be treated more tolerantly by British unionists ? Would an open 
dictator hâve more control over his membership ? This seems highly un-
likely ; the answer lies in the opposite direction. 
Lipset has attempted to explain the harsher measures often taken 
in American unions to suppress opposition, largely in terms of prévalent 
American values, as we hâve seen. American workers are potentially 
more rebellious because they are less deferential. At the same time, 
Americans and their union leaders in particular place a greater value 
on income, conspicuous consumption, and success. The American union 
leaders receive higher salaries than the British, relative to their members, 
and on the whole hâve both more motivation to retain their offices and 
more need to suppress opposition through constitutional and other means. 
While in both countries the top officers are seldom removed from office, 
in Britain this is made more tolerable by the greater participation of 
rank-and-filers in duties which, in the United States, would be performed 
to a greater extent by the much more numerous full-time officiais. The 
British willingness to perform unpaid work is presumably related to the 
greater prevalence of what Lipset calls 'aristocratie' values in the So-
ciety, 64 including an orientation toward service, while the American 
norm is that work should be paid for. Thus, greater American rebellious-
ness requires, and begets, greater suppression. The opposite side of the 
coin is that British déférence is reflected in a willingness to accept 
permanent, full-time, top (and other) officiais, which most British unions, 
in fact, hâve. Finally, the American governmental System sets the example 
of strong presidential rule, which most unions and other voluntary asso-
ciations hâve, constitutionally and in practice. 
We cannot do justice to this line of reasoning hère, as it may apply 
to union factionalism. Instead, we shall simply suggest some considéra-
tions which lead to other interprétations of the différences in factionalism 
between the two countries. Some are of minor importance, and we reserve 
judgement on an overall interprétation. 
The question of whether « the British », or just the working-class 
and lower-class British, are generally deferential toward those of higher 
64
 See LIPSET, op. cit. 
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authority or social status, is secondary to how much this applies within 
the labour movement and among union activists in particular, To a 
considérable extent, British working-class sub-culture has been penetrated 
by the contra-culture of the Labour Movement, in the sensé that the 
normative System has emerged from and centred around, a thème of 
conflict with the values of the surrounding dominant culture, based upon 
the frustrating, conflict-laden situation in which the movement (and 
perhaps the working-class as well) finds itself. 65 
There is a continuum, conceptually, from sub-culture to contra-
culture, with the latter more a social-psychologie al than a sociological 
concept. In most of the examples provided, the value of the contra-culture 
has a functional value for the individual, often reducing a sensé of strain 
and frustration induced by the cross-pressures of conflicting demands 
upon him. Unfortunately, the term contra-culture, interpreted social-
psychologically, assumes too much to be fully appropriate to the group 
phenomena we are discussing. 
Thus, perhaps the ideologically-supported egalitarianism of the 
labour movement, reflected in the relatively low salaries of British full-
time union officiais, might be interpreted as having arisen in reaction 
against the inegalitarian values and social structure of the society. In 
the United States, the group identity and solidarity of the working-class 
appear to be weaker, and stresses on workers would probably manifest 
themselves in more individualistic ways. 
Whether or not it is appropriate to discuss déférence and compe-
titiveness as aspects of culture, sub-culture or contra-culture, the orga-
nizational norms with respect to compétition for office, including high 
office, within most British unions hâve much in common, and may be 
characterized as follows : — 
(1) Any union member has the right to be considérée for any 
union office, on his own merits, without too many obstacles being put 
in his way. In some unions, knowledge of the industry and union must 
be demonstrated in a formai test before candidacy is permitted, but thèse 
seem to be objective and, where used, hâve not resulted in a dearth of 
candidates. The National Union of Railwaymen is an example. 
65
 See Michael J. YINGER, « Contra-Culture or Sub-Culture », American Socio-
logical Review, Washington, October 1960, pp. 628 ff. 
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(2) Any union member, including a candidate for office, may 
belong to any outside political party, outside union reform movement, 
provided it is a working-class group. This norm is, in fact, violated by a 
number of unions, originally under pressure from the Trades Union 
Congress during 1949-50. Occasionally officiai Communists hâve been 
barred from eligibility, in some instances because élection to the top post 
would require présence in the union's délégation to the Labour Party 
Conférence, which bars Communists. However, it is doubtful that this 
has much to support, even among activists in the unions in question. By 
and large, in British unions it is reasonably unusual for a member 
publicly to advocate, at a local union meeting, that a candidate be 
opposed because he is a member of the Communist Party. In most unions 
such behaviour would be regarded as socially unacceptable and perhaps 
eccentric. This has not been the case in the United States. 
(3) Organized internai factions are unnecessary, unfair, and pro-
babîy conspiratorial. Factions are seldom barred constitutionally, but the 
common présence in the rules of restrictions on the circulation of cam-
paign literature probably reinforces this norm against formai factions. 
(4) Finally, there is no harm done if a man tries for high office 
but gets comparatively few votes. He may eventually build a national 
réputation in this way, and get elected. But a man should not run for 
too many différent kinds of office, if some of thèse are somewhat spe-
cialized, since a man cannot be qualified for everything. Thèse norms 
plus the constitutionally prescribed relative ease of nomination in British 
unions, and voting Systems which, in effect, encourage minor candidacies, 
help explain the fact that the mean number of candidates for vacant top 
posts in Britain during 1949-66 was much greater than the number in 
the United States. 
In spite of the intervention of the Trades Union Congress on the 
Communist issue in the post-World War II period, it might be argued 
that not only the members but also the constitutions of the unions make 
an underlying apolitical assumption, where union élections are concerned. 
It is not unusual for branch-level rules to state that, when a vacancy 
occurs on an executive committee, the previously defeated candidate with 
the next highest votes shall assume office. The prevalence of permanent 
full-time élective posts also seems to support the apolitical assumption. 
Factions and Permanency of Officiais 
A full perspective on the significance of the institution of « per-
manent » full-time officiais is beyond the scope of this article, but the 
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cause and conséquences of such a rôle seem important for explaining 
différences in the degree of factionalism. In Great Britain 86 of 127 
unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress in 1952 had gênerai 
secretaries with permanent tenure. 66 Lipset has suggested that this situa-
tion, as well as the similar one in Sweden, is more likely in societies in 
which deferential values, such as strong respect of superiors, are more 
prévalent.67 On the other hand, while permanent top officers would no 
doubt be répugnant to the large majority of American workers, in theory 
and often in practice (as in the NUM) the chief British officers hâve far 
less power than the American union président. In theory the British 
gênerai secretary is a salaried employée and a servant of the union, and 
may perhaps be regarded as a civil service worker to a certain extend. 
One curious bit of évidence for the view of full-time officiais as 
civil servants is the « no canvassing » rule in élections in some unions. 
This means not only no printed literature but no open attempt to influence 
voters. This parallels the quite common rules governing the appointaient 
of local government officiais and teachers. An « Application for Engage-
ment as Principal Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, or Lecturer in Training 
Collèges (of the) London County Council » stated : - « Canvassing mem-
bers of the Council or any Committee or any body of managers or 
governors . . . or obtaining from any such member a letter of introduction 
of recommendation, will disqualify an applicant ». 68 
What makes the matter ludricous is that there is sometimes no 
written examination which might take the place of someone's subjective 
judgement. In Cardiff the injunction against canvassing applies to contact 
initiated by a teacher-applicant with those who will pass judgement upon 
him. Practically speaking, « you're damned if you do and damned if you 
don't », and the most effective sub rosa campaign often détermines the 
Victor. There can hardly be a prohibition against dropping in to a public 
house for a drink, whether or not it is in one's own locality — nor can 
one's union friends be criticized for doing so. One must not, of course, 
admit having sent them. 
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Many years ago, when Sam Watson first became an Area officiai 
in the N.U.M. in Durham, he jocularly said that he had won because 
some of his friends had done more and better « canvassing » in local 
pubs and working men's clubs than had his opponents. This occasioned 
an investigation, during which he was asked whether he had in fact sent 
three friends as canvassers. He replied that this was untrue : that the 
number was five. Somehow he survived — the matter was dropped. The 
point is that the inhérent contradiction between the values of nonpartisan-
ship and practical politics seem to hâve never been resolved, and to hâve 
remained to plague the conscience. 69 
The permanence of full-time posts has been defended on the basis 
of a regard for the welfare of union leaders as evidenced by the discussion 
at the NUM Annual Conférence on resolutions favouring periodic 
élections of officiais. The main argument seems to be that it is inhuman 
to turn out an officiai who may be advanced in years and who cannot 
return to the pits without great hardship. After ail, shall a servant of the 
union be granted less protection than any union man would want for 
himself, with respect to tenure ? 70 
No simple assumption regarding the effects of permanency on the 
resolution of the succession crisis are in order. Our research in progress 
shows a negligible, but positive relationship between permanence and 
the closeness of élections to fill top vacancies in 30 of the largest manual 
unions in Britain (biserial r = .11), with 15 unions electing to permanent 
posts. The conclusion is obvious, that permanence does not necessarily 
lead to less effective électoral opposition, but so many other factors are 
operating simultaneously that one must be cautious regarding the effects 
of permanence per se. It does appear, however, that under favourable 
circumstances the permanence of full-time officiais can, as in the British 
69 Based on interviews with Sam WATSON and a staff worker in the Durham 
area in 1961. 
?o Naturally this argument has greater weight among those who are themselves 
full-time officiais. Nevertheless, there is a genuine problem hère, and it might be 
well worth making some financial provision for older officiais who might be de-
feated, as the price for obtaining regular élections. There might then be a readier 
use of the right of « compétitive discharge » in unions already having regular 
élections. 
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Mineworkers, 71 offer the lower-ranking full-time officiais enough security 
to allow them to compete, unabashed, for vacancies at higher levels. 
The effects of permanence on the prevalence and continuity of fac-
tions is another matter. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that a more 
fréquent use of the électoral machinery for important posts offers more 
opportunities for factions to function, while an infrequent and irregular 
use provides less motivation for their maintenance. This may be so, but 
one must return to the basic fact that the Britain unions electing high 
officers periodically do not, in the whole, hâve openly operating internai 
factions. One must suspect that différences in the prevalence of factional 
organization between those electing permanently and periodically are not 
overwhelming. Thus it can hardly be said that the less extensive and less 
open factions in British unions results substantially from the prevalence 
of permanent posts. 
In summary, the existence of permanent posts seem to indicate, 
along with other aspects of British unions, a less political view, or a 
civil service view of full-time office, although permanence itself is con-
troversial in some unions. Permanence may depress factionalïsm to 
some extent, but it can hardly explain British-American différences in 
this respect. Permanence is not associated with less compétition for vacant 
posts in Britain. Both permanence and restrictions on factional commu-
nications in élections are explicitly supported by longstanding provisions 
in the rules of British unions. Whatever the origin of thèse rules, they 
are obviously legitimate and self-perpetuating, as are most facets of 
formai organization, and their prevalence in the union movement offers 
further support. They may or may not be supported by most union 
members, but if they are it may be more because « they are there » than 
because they are consonant with more basic attitudes of values. 
Organizational Norms in American Unions 
The American situation is much more heterogeneous, with generally 
a sharp break between the older and the newer unions. Many union 
constitutions bar political subversives from membership, while others 
outlaw internai factions, or give the président the power to expel or take 
severe measures against factionalists. On the other hand, many American 
union constitutions not only hâve no such clauses, but lack the usual 
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British proscription against the free circulation of campaign literature. 
On the other hand, appointed full-time officiais, national or otherwise, 
often engage in pro-administration electioneering without, apparently, 
encountering strong opposition from ordinary members or activists. But 
it must be admitted that the powers of the American union président are 
so great as to make it almost impossible to prevent such use of his office. 
The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 establishes certain rights for minority 
candidates — such as space in the union newspaper — and theoretically 
limits the expenditure of union funds for campaign purposes. Union mem-
bership lists for mailings are often made available to opposition factions, 
by court order if necessary, and it is taken for granted that sizeable 
contributions from supporters of a faction may be necessary. No doubt 
the local unions would allocate funds to support candidates in union 
élections without membership objection if it were not illégal in principle. 
British Tolérance 
It may be that the leaders of minority political tendencies in British 
unions are somewhat accepting of anti-factional norms because thèse 
offer them a certain amount of protection, or at least subject them to 
little abuse. The absence of large numbers of appointed full-time staff 
in British unions deprives the top officers of a campaign weapon ordi-
narily available in American unions of at least moderate size, and other 
abuse of the administrative machinery is more limited in Britain as well. 
However, it may also be that a greater gênerai British tolérance of 
political dissent is reflected within unions in a better treatment of political 
opposition. We may thus be faced with the paradox of tolérance sup-
porting restraint on ail sides. This is an uncomfortable position to défend, 
since one might as well argue the opposite point. Nevertheless, there is 
some évidence for a greater tolérance of dissenters in British society. 72 
CONCLUDING REMARKS : TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
We can conclude that there is a lack of appréciation among British 
unionists and industrial relations experts of what Americans usually mean 
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198 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 28, NO 1 
by union factionalism.73 It would usually be assumed that the faction 
would hâve (a) a name, (b) a known and admitted leadership, (c) publi-
cations, often including a newspaper, (d) a membership much broader 
(if possible) than simply the leading lights or full-time officiais, and often 
(e) open or invited meetings. Probably some meetings would be open 
and some would be closed (limited to members or friends), although it 
is difficult to picture keeping secrets on strategy at an Auto Workers' 
Convention. 
A scheme for analyzing factions in terms of their dimensions would 
include : -
1. The degree of continuity at the national level. 
2. Openness versus convertness. 
3. The size and exclusiveness of membership (perhaps this is not inde-
pendent of 2 and 4). 
4. The degree to which they include rank-and-filers or others lower 
down the hierarchy. 
5. The degree to which they are issue-orientated (degree of politicization). 
6. The degree of linkage of local (if any) and national (if any) fac-
tionalism. 
7. The degree of legitimacy, in both constitutional and normative terms. 
8. And related to 7, the extent of limitations on the functioning of 
factions (or of freedom from restrictions on meetings, flyers of ail 
types, use of mass média and perhaps courts (governments). It is 
conceivable that an entirely legitimate and open faction might be 
required to utilize only officially approved channels of communica-
tion (such as the union-provided élection addresses). 
73 For an earlier discussion of this lack of appréciation, see J. David EDELSTEIN 
and Malcolm WARNER (with William F. COOKE) « Patterns of Opposition in British 
and American Unions », Sociology, Oxford, Vol. 4, No. 2, May 1970, pp. 145-163. 
The article discusses the extent of électoral opposition for top posts in 31 British, 
and 51 American unions of manual workers and reveals great différences between 
and within two countries, with more compétition or opposition than might hâve 
been expected. An examination of organizational différences between the two sets 
of unions leads to the conclusion that most of the formai différences might be 
expected to generate more opposition in the British cases than in the American. 
While there are somewhat more defeats of incumbents in American unions, there 
is significantly more opposition in British unions as measured by the closeness of 
électoral contests, for vacant posts in particular. 
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Probably no simple generalization is warrented concerning the effects 
of union factionalism on the overall social process, either in terms of 
collective bargaining or politics more broadly. It is probably best to 
emphasize that changes in union leaderships seldom hâve as great an 
impact on collective bargaining as factional leaders claim, or as employers 
or workers hope or fear. This has been attributable, in Britain and the 
United States, to the constraints of the situation, especially the limited 
strength of the unions as against the employers ; the usual willingness of 
left-wingers in power, including Communists, to reach accommodations 
which will allow them to retain office for its own sake or for political 
advantage on the national scène ; the broad consensus among unionists 
on immédiate demands upon both employers and government : the 
absence of a social crisis sufficient to engender severe political instability ; 
and the infrequency with which national union leaderships do in fact 
change. This is not to say that factions are unimportant ; they are often 
the vehicle for focusing attention on employées' grievances and for the 
adjustment of union demands, usually without a change in leadership. 
Since such changes hâve often been of great importance to the 
workers immediately concerned, sometimes workers in an entire industry, 
the short-term or visible impact on the society is not the only criterion 
for signifieance in the social process. 
This is not to deny that intra-organizational factionalism may be 
involved in rare but major changes in the nature of the labour movement, 
such as the rise of industrial unionism in the United States, the formation 
of a Labour Party, or the domination of a labour movement by a par-
ticular political tendency. The active participants in such factional strug-
gles hâve often believed, as hâve political activists in ail sphères, in their 
capacity to influence, perhaps détermine, national political directions. 
The fact that organizational politics cannot be separated from national 
politics in such matters does not prove them wrong. 
LE FACTIONNALISME DANS LES SYNDICATS 
EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET AUX ÉTATS-UNIS 
Dans notre société de plus et plus institutionnalisée, les factions à l'intérieur 
des associations volontaires jouent un rôle sans cesse grandissant dans l'ensemble 
du processus politique. 
Une analyse critique que nous pouvons appliquer aux organisations, qu'il s'agisse 
de l'État, des gouvernements locaux, des clubs ou des syndicats, est la façon dont 
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elles disposent des conflits et des désaccords à l'intérieur de leurs cadres. Le 
rôle des conflits de rivalité interne chez les syndicats est dune importance et 
d'un intérêt majeurs, et on peut le considérer comme essentiellement relié à toute 
Ja question du fonctionnement de la démocratie à l'intérieur de ces associations. 
Quelle que soit la forme qu'il revête, l'état de conflit n'est jamais bienvenu au sein 
des associations. En outre, il est évident qu'il y a plusieurs séries de conflits possi-
bles dans un syndicat. Certains considèrent les factions comme une affaire de rivalité 
interne qu'il faut régler si l'on veut que l'association survive. En conséquence, les 
associations s'efforcent généralement d'enrayer l'expansion du déviationnisme con-
sidérant ainsi comme sujet tabou la formation de factions. 
Dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, l'opposition qui s'exprime par le jeu 
des élections peut ne comporter ni factions ni partis. Dans une étude récente, des 
anthropologues ont posé le problème de la façon suivante : les factions sont des 
groupes de rivalité politique dont les leaders recrutent des membres au nom de 
principes variés. Selon un autre point de vue, les considérer comme des « courants » 
en action offrirait un mode d'analyse autrement plus significatif. Nous devrions 
utiliser le mot « faction » pour signifier au moins quelque chose d'un peu organisé, 
un groupe politique qui recherche un objectif précis à l'intérieur d'une organisation 
plus vaste. L'existence de factions dans les centrales et les syndicats est très cou-
rante dans le monde occidental. La Confédération suisse des syndicats possède une 
structure qui permet une certaine participation dans la prise de décision sans passer 
par le truchement des syndicats. On a attribué en partie cette formule nouvelle de 
participation aux décisions à des factions parmi les syndicats à l'intérieur de la 
Confédération où l'on décèle trois nuances diverses en matière d'orientation idéolo-
gique. En général, cependant, les factions, même lorsqu'elles tendent à s'appuyer 
sur des structures institutionnalisées, peuvent rarement s'expliquer par elles-mêmes. 
Les syndicats bataillent souvent les uns contre les autres, soit pour obtenir 
l'adhésion des membres, soit pour s'assurer l'hégémonie à l'intérieur du mouvement 
ouvrier. Sur la scène américaine, on rencontre nombre d'exemples de factions qui 
se détachent éventuellement du syndicat. Les factions fondées sur la concurrence 
entre syndicats ou entre centrales syndicales ont ordinairement la vie courte, puis-
qu'une scission, un changement d'affiliation ou l'expulsion des propagandistes de 
l'association rivale ne tardent pas à se produire. 
Sans doute, les dirigeants d'un syndicat n'exercent-ils que peu d'influence directe 
sur la création des factions au sein d'un autre s'ils ne disposent pas de moyens de 
contact sur ses membres. Les factions syndicales qui dépassent les frontières de cer-
tains syndicats déterminés demeurent dans les limites du mouvement syndical. Elles 
sont formées des groupes socialistes ou autres dont l'activité est d'abord orientée vers 
les travailleurs et les syndicats. 
On a prétendu que les catégories professionnelles ne pouvaient pas engendrer 
une action politique qui soit démocratique et soutenue au sein d'un syndicat. Pour-
tant, la diversité des postes peut faire problème même à l'intérieur d'une association 
professionnelle. Même si la diversité des postes ne peut pas facilement être à l'ori-
gine d'une action démocratique institutionnalisée, elle est souvent à l'origine d'une 
lutte temporaire entre des factions. Il y a eu au moins l'exemple important d'un 
cas en Angleterre où la politique de gauche et des intérêts professionnels se sont 
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combinés à l'intérieur d'un syndicat, et ont eu une influence sur la négociation col-
lective et, d'une façon moins évidente, sur le syndicat lui-même. L'existence de 
factions au sein des syndicats reflète donc souvent l'influence d'organisations ou de 
forces externes qui sont en concurrence, en particulier celles dont les structures 
s'insèrent dans celles des syndicats pris individuellement ou les chevauchent. 
Un bref exposé sur la nature des factions organisées en tant que mouvements 
aident à illustrer la présence de quelques-uns au moins des facteurs précédemment 
décrits. Des illustrations supplémentaires du degré d'organisation de tels clans dans 
les syndicats américains en fournit un autre exemple récent, soit la montée des grou-
pes syndicaux formés de travailleurs noirs qui se fondent sur la nécessité, selon leur 
point de vue en tout cas, de combattre « la bureaucratie syndicale ». 
Dans les syndicats britanniques, les factions se présentent sous une forme moins 
organisée et moins évidente. Ce sont : 
1. des réseaux de communication flous constitués de dirigeants et d'activistes de 
même mentalité qui sont ordinairement politisés ; 
2. des réseaux de communication qui sont parfois coordonnés par les membres de 
groupes ou de partis politiques extérieurs ; 
3. de mouvements de délégués d'atelier appartenant généralement à la gauche ; et, 
4. plus rarement, des réunions de permanents convoquées sans publicité mais qui 
ne sont pas tout à fait secrètes. 
Cet exposé ne serait pas complet si nous ne considérions pas le rôle des factions 
proprement communistes et anticommunistes, qu'elles soient internes ou externes. 
Que la polarisation autour de tels groupes soit ou non justifiée de la part des syn-
diqués de gauche ou de droite, il semble que, en surface du moins, elles aient dominé 
les luttes partisanes dans certains syndicats à différentes époques. On ne peut com-
prendre qu'à la lumière de peu d'organisation de la gauche non-communiste la 
persistance du rôle du parti communiste officiel dans les rivalités syndicales internes 
en Grande-Bretagne. 
Il est fort difficile de tenter d'expliquer un comportement en se basant sur la 
culture. Une des raisons en est le fait que les explications ont tendance à ne pas 
sortir d'un cercle vicieux : on prend pour acquis que les normes et les valeurs com-
munes dérivent du comportement et on présume que les courants de pensées se 
transmettent par l'éducation sociale en croyant qu'il ne s'agirait que d'une simple 
adaptation à une situation existentielle immuable. L'argument fondamental le plus 
pertinent à signaler au sujet des différences de culture politique en Grande-Bretagne 
et aux États-Unis c'est que, en plaçant l'accent sur l'orientation psychologique en 
vue d'objectifs sociaux, alors qu'il n'y a aucune différence importante entre eux 
dans l'aptitude à « réagir à une loi injuste », les Britanniques ont de meilleurs espoirs 
d'« être écoutés sérieusement des officines du gouvernement ou de la police ». Il 
se pourrait que la réalité soit plus complexe : les Britanniques (comparativement aux 
Américains) ont un respect méritoire pour l'autorité administrative tant celle des 
syndicats que celle du gouvernement, lorsque l'impartialité d'une telle administration 
est en cause, et ils peuvent marquer, d'autre part, un respect généralisé et immérité, 
par exemple, pour les titres aristocratiques et les institutions. Lipset a tenté d'expli-
quer les moyens plus violents utilisés par les syndicats américains pour supprimer 
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l'opposition par les valeurs américaines dominantes. L'esprit de rébellion plus marqué 
des Américains exige et suscite une répression plus forte. L'envers de la médaille, 
c'est que la déférence anglaise se reflète dans la bonne volonté avec laquelle les 
Britanniques acceptent les fonctionnaires permanents et à plein temps des hautes 
sphères ou d'autres niveaux qu'on rencontre dans les syndicats. 
Qu'il soit ou non pertinent de traiter de la déférence ou de l'agressivité en tant 
qu'aspects de la culture, de la sous-culture ou de l'anti-culture, les normes institu-
tionnelles, en ce qui concerne la course aux postes, y compris les postes de com-
mande au sein de la plupart des syndicats britanniques, ont beaucoup de choses en 
commun, et on peut ainsi les caractériser : 
1. Tout membre d'un syndicat britannique a le droit de postuler n'importe quelle 
fonction syndicale selon les capacités qu'il se croit sans qu'il soit mis beaucoup 
d'obstacles sur sa route. 
2. Tout membre d'un syndicat, y compris des candidats à la direction, peut appar-
tenir à un parti politique extérieur, à tout mouvement de réforme syndicale exté-
rieur, pourvu qu'il appartienne à la classe ouvrière. 
3. Les factions internes et structurées sont jugées inutiles, inéquitables et on les 
assimile presque à des complots. 
4. Enfin, il ne résulte aucun tort du fait que quelqu'un pose sa candidature à un 
poste élevé et qu'il ne reçoive que peu de votes. 
Il paraît normal que l'usage fréquent des élections pour accéder aux postes 
importants fournisse davantage d'occasions aux factions de fonctionner alors qu'une 
utilisation rare et irrégulière de ce mécanisme affaiblit les motivations d'y recourir. 
En résumé, l'existence des postes permanents, de même que d'autres aspects du 
syndicalisme britannique, semble indiquer que l'on considère les postes à temps plein 
moins sous l'angle de la politique que du fonctionnariat, même si la pennanence 
elle-même est controversée dans certains syndicats. En conséquence, il se peut aussi 
que, d'une façon générale, l'esprit de tolérance plus marqué des Britanniques se 
traduise au sein des syndicats par une meilleure acceptation de l'opposition politique. 
Nous pouvons ainsi être en présence du paradoxe de la tolérance qui sert partout 
de support à la contrainte. 
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